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INTRODUCTION
A “reverse-Erie”1 problem arises when a state court is hearing a federal
cause of action2 and confronts a situation in which a state law and a federal
law conflict. The term finds its etymological origin in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, which dealt with the opposite problem of a federal court sitting in
diversity confronting a situation where a state law and a federal law conflict.3
As Professor Kevin Clermont noted in one of the only in-depth scholarly
papers exclusively on reverse-Erie, the topic is “strangely ignored by most
scholars” and often “misunderstood, mischaracterized, and misapplied by
judges and commentators.”4
Although reverse-Erie problems are regularly dealt with at the state
court level,5 they are rarely dealt with at the federal level. Since a reverse-Erie

1 Some commentators alternatively use the term “converse-Erie,” Joseph R. Oliveri, ConverseErie: The Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative State, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372
(2008), or “inverse-Erie,” Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track,
49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 941 n.10 (1988). For consistency, this Comment refers to the concept as
“reverse-Erie.”
2 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748 (2012) (noting that concurrent
state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action is a presumption rebuttable only by express
congressional intent for exclusive federal court jurisdiction); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394
(1947) (holding that state courts of competent jurisdiction may not refuse to hear federal causes of
action).
3 308 U.S. 64 (1938).
4 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
5 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1960 (2011) (“[S]imply by virtue of their numbers, state courts hear
more federal-question cases than do federal courts, and so these state cases have a significant effect
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problem, by definition, can arise only in state court, the only federal court
that can consider a reverse-Erie problem is the U.S. Supreme Court on a
writ of certiorari from a state court of last resort6—an infrequent occurrence.7 Indeed, commentators consider only four reverse-Erie cases to be
seminal8 in the development of the current doctrine.
Given that these four cases were decided decades apart from each other
and do not use a consistent methodology,9 state courts facing reverse-Erie
problems are left to resolve the Supreme Court’s ambiguity in this area.
The result has been virtual chaos, with state courts approaching reverse-Erie
problems with different methodologies that lead to divergent results.10 This
Comment attempts to develop an analytically cogent framework for the
treatment of reverse-Erie problems.
At the outset, it is important to note that a reverse-Erie problem can
occur when (1) a federal constitutional provision conflicts with a state law;
(2) an express federal statutory provision conflicts with a state law; (3)
federal common law fashioned or endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court
conflicts with a state law; (4) federal common law fashioned or endorsed by
an inferior federal court conflicts with a state law; or (5) a state law conflicts
with the interests inherent in a federal statute (i.e., the creation of federal
common law may be justified where it does not already exist).11
In the first three categories, a state court operating under the command
of the Supremacy Clause is bound to follow the federal rule as long as it is
pertinent and valid.12 Thus, this Comment focuses on categories four and
on the meaning of federal law.”); infra notes 246-49 (providing a range of cases where state courts
faced reverse-Erie problems).
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (allowing the U.S. Supreme Court to hear appeals from
decisions of “the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had” implicating federal law).
7 See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1269 (2012) (noting that, between the Court’s 1993 and 2008 terms,
appeals from a state supreme court constituted only thirteen percent of the Court’s docket).
8 See Clermont, supra note 4, at 23 (identifying these seminal decisions as Brown v. Western
Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342
U.S. 359 (1952); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); and Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997)).
9 See infra note 244.
10 See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
11 But see Clermont, supra note 4, at 20 (defining reverse-Erie more narrowly to include only
the first three categories that this Comment identifies).
12 See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”); Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 689 (N.C. 1999)
(“[F]ederal common law rules . . . are binding on the states through the supremacy clause.”);
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 897 &
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five, where pertinent federal common law created or endorsed by an inferior
federal court exists or where pertinent federal common law has yet to be
created by any federal court.
The goal of this Comment is to examine the limitations on the federal
courts in creating federal common law and to apply these limitations in
developing a unified theory for treating reverse-Erie problems. This Comment develops an analytical framework for state court judges to use when
facing a situation where a state rule conflicts with federal common law
fashioned by an inferior federal court or with federal statutory interests that
may justify the creation of federal common law.
Part I recounts the facts and legal holdings of the Court’s four seminal
reverse-Erie cases. These cases are used for illustrative purposes throughout
the Comment. Part II demonstrates that the Supreme Court is creating
common law, rather than engaging in statutory interpretation, in its reverseErie cases. Thus, the Supreme Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases fall
within the fifth category of reverse-Erie identified above.
Part III introduces the Rules of Decision Act (RDA)13 as the main limitation on the power of the Court to create federal common law. Part III
demonstrates that, once the RDA is seen as a limitation on the Court’s
power to create common law, the notion that the Court is “preempting”
state law in its reverse-Erie cases is misleading.
Additionally, given that the Court is fashioning common law in its reverseErie cases, Part III provides an in-depth examination of the nature of the
RDA limitation on the power of the Court to create federal common law.14
The primary question when the Court is deciding whether it should fashion
federal common law under an RDA approach is: Has Congress required in
its statute that the Court create a uniform judge-made rule? To this end,
Part III examines the Court’s federal common law jurisprudence with the
goal of illuminating when the Court is more or less likely to determine that
a federal statute has required the creation of a uniform judge-made rule.

n.64 (1986) (citing U.S. Supreme Court cases that hold federal common law to be binding on state
court judges).
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).
14 A discussion of the power of federal courts to create common law is beyond the scope of
this Comment. This Comment assumes that federal courts have the power to create common law
under a delegated theory of federal common law making power and discusses only the limits on
that power. For a discussion of the delegated theory of federal common law making power, see
generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 825, 862-77 (2005).
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The Comment then evaluates the Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases
against this RDA theory of federal common law making to determine how
faithful the Court has been to this statutory limit on its power. Part III
concludes that the Court has been inconsistent in its reverse-Erie cases with
the methodology it has used in determining that a federal statute has or has
not required that the Court fashion federal common law.
With the limits on the power of federal courts to create common law
explored, Part IV develops an analytical framework for state court judges to
use when facing a reverse-Erie problem in categories four and five. This
analytical framework is based on the idea that a state court facing a problem
of federal law must decide the issue as it believes the U.S. Supreme Court,
which is bound by the RDA, would decide the issue.
Part IV begins by addressing the fourth category of reverse-Erie (pertinent federal common law created by inferior federal courts). The Comment
argues that state court judges should give federal common law created by
federal courts of appeals a presumption of correctness. That is to say, a state
court should presume that the federal court of appeals acted within its RDA
limit as outlined in Part III of this Comment. However, where the state
court finds that the federal court of appeals’ creation of the common law
was clearly erroneous (i.e., the federal court of appeals clearly erred by not
adhering to the RDA limit on its power), the state court should not be
required to follow the common law.
As to the fifth category of reverse-Erie (yet uncreated federal common
law), Part IV links the inconsistency of the Supreme Court in dealing with
its reverse-Erie cases to the inconsistency of the state courts in dealing with
such cases. Part IV applies the RDA limit developed in Part III to propose
an analytical framework for state courts to use when facing a situation
where the interests inherent in a federal statute may justify the creation of
federal common law where it does not already exist. Finally, the Comment
selects a variety of state court cases dealing with reverse-Erie problems in
this fifth category and evaluates them against the proposed analytical
framework.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FOUR SEMINAL
REVERSE-ERIE CASES
The first step in developing a unified theory of reverse-Erie is to review
the Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases—Brown,15 Dice,16 Felder,17 and
Johnson.18
15

Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
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A. Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for modern reverse-Erie doctrine in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama.19 Brown was an employee of
the Western Railway of Alabama.20 He filed a Federal Employers Liability
Act (FELA) claim21 in Georgia state court against his employer after he was
injured at work.22 He alleged that the Railway had negligently allowed
clinkers23 to accumulate along the side of the railway tracks, which had
injured him after he stepped on them while performing his job.24
At the time of his suit, Georgia state courts operated under a local
pleading rule that required the court to construe pleading allegations in
favor of the defendant.25 In faithfully following the local pleading rule, the
state court inferred that Brown had been injured due to his own negligence.26 The Georgia state court thus sustained the Railway’s demurrer and
dismissed the case.27
The Supreme Court reversed.28 It determined that Brown’s allegations
were sufficient to permit a jury to infer negligence on the part of the
Railway under FELA.29 In doing so, the Court noted that “the [allegations]
if proven would show an injury of the precise kind for which Congress has
provided a recovery [in FELA].”30 The Court added that “[s]trict local rules
of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of
recovery authorized by federal laws.”31
Thus, Brown framed the reverse-Erie problem as a question of the extent
to which a state rule can interfere with the effectuation of a federal statute’s
purpose. This insight laid the foundation for the Court’s subsequent
reverse-Erie jurisprudence.
16
17
18
19
20
21

Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
Brown, 338 U.S. at 294.
Id.
See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006) (“Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . .”).
22 Brown, 338 U.S. at 294.
23 Clinkers are jagged pieces of rock that are the byproduct of burning coal.
24 Id. at 297.
25 Id. at 295.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 299.
29 Id. at 298.
30 Id. at 297.
31 Id. at 298.
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B. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.
Only three years after Brown, the Court decided the second of its four
seminal reverse-Erie cases—Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad
Co.32 Dice was a railroad fireman who filed a FELA negligence claim in
Ohio state court against his employer, a railroad company, after being
injured during a work accident.33 The railroad defended the claim by
producing a document signed by the fireman releasing the railroad from all
liability for a sum of money.34 Dice claimed that the railroad fraudulently
induced him to sign the document.35
A jury ruled in favor of Dice, finding fraud on the part of the railroad,
but the trial court subsequently entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.36 The trial court ruled that, under Ohio law, it was Dice’s responsibility to read the release document before signing it, regardless of any
fraud.37 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court found that state law, not
federal law, governed the validity of the release and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.38
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.39 The Court began by noting that
the issue before the Court—the validity of a release under FELA—was a
federal issue to be determined by reference to federal law.40 However, no
federal common law existed on this topic.41 When a court determines that
an issue is to be decided in reference to federal common law, but no pertinent common law yet exists, the court can either (1) create a uniform judgemade federal rule; or (2) adopt state law as the federal rule of decision.42
The Court held that incorporating state law as a federal rule of decision
would be inconsistent with the “general policy of the Act to give railroad
employees a right to recover just compensation for injuries negligently
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

342 U.S. 359 (1952).
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 361.
Id.
See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 92 (1991) (adopting a state rule
of demand futility as the federal rule of decision in a stockholder derivative action brought under a
federal statute); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739 (1979) (adopting state law
as the federal rule of decision regarding the priority of liens arising from federal government
lending programs); see also generally Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and
Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 757-58 (1986).
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inflicted by their employers.”43 Based on this finding, the Court announced
a uniform judge-made rule that a release to a FELA claim is void if fraudulently induced.44
The Court additionally held that the state practice of having a judge
rather than a jury determine certain aspects of fraud was improper.45 It
explained that “[t]he right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature
of our system of federal jurisprudence and that it is part and parcel of the
remedy afforded railroad workers under [FELA].”46
Where Brown understood reverse-Erie to be a question as to what extent
a state rule could inhibit the vindication of a federal statute’s purpose, Dice
provided the theoretical basis for that inquiry. The Court could engage in
the Brown inquiry because reverse-Erie presented questions that were to be
determined in reference to federal law.
C. Felder v. Casey
After Dice, over thirty-five years passed before the Court decided its
next meaningful reverse-Erie case—Felder v. Casey.47 Felder was a Wisconsin
citizen who was stopped by Milwaukee police officers for questioning.48 An
altercation ensued and Felder filed a § 1983 action nine months later against
the officers for violating his federal constitutional rights.49 The officers
moved to dismiss the claim for failure to satisfy a Wisconsin notice-of-claim
requirement that required a plaintiff suing a state or local officer to notify
the officer within 120 days of the alleged injury of his intent to file suit.50
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the state notice-of-claim provision was applicable.51 It reasoned that a party that chooses to bring a federal
action in state court must abide by state procedures.52 It further noted that
the remedial and deterrent goals of § 1983 were not compromised by the
state notice-of-claim provision and that the state had legitimate interests in
enacting a notice-of-claim provision.53

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Dice, 342 U.S. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
487 U.S. 131, 134 (1988).
Id.
Felder, 487 U.S. at 135.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
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Yet again, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.54 In doing so, the Court
noted that the reverse-Erie question is a question of obstacle preemption.55
The Court began by holding that the state notice-of-claim provision was not
a neutral and uniformly applicable state rule of procedure56 and was inconsistent with the remedial aims of § 1983.57 In light of these two facts, it
noted that any legitimate reasons that the state had for enacting such a
notice-of-claim provision were immaterial.58
The Court then went a step further and, citing Erie, held that the state
provision was also obstacle preempted by § 1983 because it was outcomedeterminative.59 The state provision “predictably alter[ed] the outcome
of § 1983 claims depending solely on whether they [were] brought in state
or federal court.”60 Finally, the Court noted that the state rule “discriminate[d]” against the federal statute because it applied only to the precise
type of action that the federal statute authorized—a claim against a governmental defendant.61
Felder changed the landscape of the reverse-Erie inquiry. Although the
Court had undertaken the traditional Brown inquiry, rather than embracing
the Dice theory that reverse-Erie problems presented federal issues to be
determined in reference to federal law, the Felder Court framed the inquiry
in the language of preemption. In addition to this theoretical shift, the
Court introduced three new tests that asked (1) whether the state rule was
of uniform and neutral applicability; (2) whether the application of the state
rule was outcome-determinative; and (3) whether the state rule discriminated
against the federal right.

54
55

Id. at 138.
Id. (“The question before us today . . . is essentially one of pre-emption: . . . does the
enforcement of [the state] requirement . . . ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
56 A neutral and uniformly applicable state rule of procedure is also known as a transsubstantive
rule. Transsubstantive “procedural” rules are rules that apply to all cases regardless of their subject
matter. In the state law context, such rules would be found in the states’ equivalent of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
57 Felder, 487 U.S. at 144-45.
58 Id. at 143.
59 Id. at 151 & 153.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 146.
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D. Johnson v. Fankell
The Court’s final meaningful reverse-Erie case came almost ten years
later in Johnson v. Fankell.62 Fankell, a terminated Idaho state employee,
filed a § 1983 action against state officials, alleging a violation of her due
process rights.63 The state officials moved to dismiss based on qualified
immunity.64 The trial court denied the state officials’ motion, and the Idaho
Supreme Court dismissed the officials’ appeal of that decision.65 In dismissing the appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a denial of a motion to
dismiss for qualified immunity was not appealable under state law.66
This time the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.67 The Court began by
observing that the rule regarding the appealability of the denial of a pretrial
motion was “a neutral state Rule regarding the administration of the state
courts.”68 Citing Felder, the Court then held that the state rule was not
outcome-determinative because the denial of a motion to dismiss for
qualified immunity would be reviewable by the state courts after a trial.69
The Court noted that, unlike Felder, the state rule did not “discriminate”
against the federal right.70
Finally, the Court found no right to an interlocutory appeal in § 1983
itself.71 Rather, the Court noted that the right to such an appeal is found in
28 U.S.C. § 1291,72 a statute that has no application to state courts.73 It
concluded that § 1983 did not preempt the state rule.74
Thus, Johnson cemented the modern approach to reverse-Erie that the
Court had established in Felder. The Court now treats reverse-Erie problems as questions of preemption, rather than viewing them as matters to be
decided in reference to federal law as it did in Dice. Additionally, the Court
continues to apply the concept from Brown and Dice that a state rule may
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

520 U.S. 911 (1997).
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id. at 913-14.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 918 n.9.
Id. at 921 n.12.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). A ruling on qualified immunity
would be appealable in federal court pursuant to § 1291 under the collateral order doctrine.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
73 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921 n.12.
74 Id. at 923.
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have to yield when it conflicts with the purpose of a federal statute. However,
unlike in Brown and Dice, the Court also uses the neutral and uniformly
applicable state rule test, the outcome-determination test, and the state rule
discrimination test in deciding whether a state rule will be preempted.
With an understanding of the Court’s four seminal reverse-Erie cases,
Part II discusses why the three cases that resulted in new federal rules—
Brown, Dice, and Felder—were instances of federal common law making.
II. REVERSE-ERIE AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW MAKING
As Part I explains, the modern Court views reverse-Erie as a problem of
obstacle preemption. There are two ways to view the task performed by the
Court when it preempts a state rule: the Court is either engaging in statutory
interpretation or federal common law making.75 A careful examination of
the Court’s reverse-Erie cases leads to the conclusion that the Court is
fashioning federal common law in these cases, rather than engaging in mere
statutory interpretation.
Over time, two general definitions of federal common law have
emerged, one broad and one narrow. Under the broad definition, a court
engages in common law making if it is looking beyond the text of a statute
when it formulates a legal rule to fill a gap in a statute.76 An alternative
formulation of this broad view states that a court creates federal common
law when the text of a statute does not clearly suggest the resulting legal
rule.77
The broad view of common law has intuitive appeal. It strains the English language to consider a legal rule that is not provided for or clearly
suggested by the text of a statute to be the product of statutory (i.e.,
textual) interpretation. What is being interpreted when a court engages in
statutory interpretation if not the meaning of the words of the statute itself?
The broad view easily encompasses the Court’s reverse-Erie cases. In
Brown and Dice, the Court never identified an express provision of FELA
that explicitly addressed or clearly suggested pleading requirements, the
validity of releases, or the requirement of a jury trial. Similarly, in Felder,
the Court did not identify an express provision of § 1983 that explicitly
75
76

Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 278 (2000).
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7
(1985) (“[F]ederal common law . . . refers to legal rules (substantive or procedural) that . . . are
not found on the face of an authoritative federal text . . . .”).
77 See Field, supra note 12, at 890 (stating that federal common law is “any rule of federal law
created by a court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not
clearly suggested by federal enactments” (footnote omitted)).
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addressed or clearly suggested any notice-of-claim requirement or lack of
notice-of-claim requirement. Under the broad view, the Court was creating
common law in all three cases.
In contrast, some scholars prefer a narrow view that places federal common law and statutory interpretation on a continuum instead of using a
bright-line rule. The oft-quoted maxim of this approach is that “[t]he
difference between ‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind.”78
Under this narrow view, the inquiry focuses on whether a court is looking
beyond the specific intent of the drafters of the legislation and trying to
ascertain their general intent.79 The proponents of this narrow view presumably
use the continuum to deal with tough in-between cases where it is unclear
whether a court is following the specific intentions of the draftsmen or more
general intentions in filling in a gap in a statute.
None of the Court’s reverse-Erie cases fall in this in-between zone. Nowhere in Brown did the Court identify any potential specific intent of
Congress regarding pleading requirements for FELA actions. Rather, the
Court based its “new”80 pleading requirement for FELA actions on the
proposition that the facts set out in the complaint “if proven would show an
injury of the precise kind for which Congress has provided a recovery.”81
This proposition is fairly characterized as the general intent of Congress
that plaintiffs with such allegations should have their day in court.
Similarly, in Dice, the Court based its new jury requirement in FELA
actions on the fact that a jury trial was “part and parcel of the remedy
afforded railroad workers under [FELA].”82 The Court failed to point to
any specific intent of Congress to support this proposition83 but found it
sufficient that “[t]he right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature

78 Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980).
79 See Merrill, supra note 76, at 5 (“[Under the narrow] view, federal common law is not
qualitatively different from textual interpretation, but rather is an extension of it, with ‘interpretation’ now understood in a broader sense than the search for the specific intentions of the
draftsmen.”).
80 The term “new” is used in this context to mean that the rule was not provided for by statute
or prior common law.
81 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 297 (1949).
82 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
83 See id. at 367-68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[FELA] does not require a State to have
juries for negligence actions brought under the Federal Act in its courts. . . . Nothing in [FELA]
or in the judicial enforcement of the Act for over forty years forces such judicial hybridization
upon the States.”).
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of our system of federal jurisprudence.”84 This reasoning supports the view
that the Court was looking to Congress’s general intent. Congress legislated
against the backdrop of this principle and thus the principle’s continued
vitality was part of Congress’s general intent.85
As for the Court’s new rule in Dice regarding the validity of a release of
a FELA claim, the Court was more explicit that it was following the general
intent of Congress. In declaring the rule that a fraudulently obtained release
of a FELA claim was not valid, the Court noted that “[a]pplication of [the
opposite] rule to defeat a railroad employee's claim is wholly incongruous
with the general policy of the Act to give railroad employees a right to recover
just compensation for injuries negligently inflicted by their employers.”86
Finally, in Felder, the Court did not identify any specific intent of Congress not to have a notice-of-claim requirement in § 1983 actions, such as a
proposed, but rejected, notice-of-claim amendment to § 1983.87 Rather, the
Court based its decision on the notion that a notice-of-claim requirement
was inconsistent with the “compensatory goals of the federal legislation”88—
in other words, the general intent of Congress. Specifically, the Court
found “the notion that a State could require civil rights victims to seek
compensation from offending state officials before they could assert a
federal action in state court” to be “utterly inconsistent with the remedial
purposes” of § 1983.89
Thus, under either the broad or narrow definition of common law, the
Court created common law in its three reverse-Erie cases that resulted in a
new federal rule—Brown, Dice, and Felder. In all three cases, the Court used
the general intent of the enacting Congress to fill in a statutory gap, rather
than developing a rule provided for or clearly suggested by the text of the
statute in question.
Once one understands that the Court is creating federal common law in
its reverse-Erie cases, the question becomes: What are the limits on the
power of the Court to create federal common law? It is here that the RDA
enters the conversation.

84
85

Id. at 363 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Allison C. Giles, Note, The Value of Nonlegislators’ Contributions to Legislative History, 79
GEO. L.J. 359, 380 (1990) (noting that Congress’s general intent can be illuminated by examining
the “background against which Congress was operating when it enacted the statute”).
86 Dice, 342 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added).
87 See infra note 234.
88 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988).
89 Id. at 149.
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III. THE RULES OF DECISION ACT AS A LIMITATION ON FEDERAL
COMMON LAW MAKING
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.90

These words limit the power of federal courts to create uniform judgemade rules (i.e., make common law)91 to situations in which the Constitution or a federal statute “require[s] or provide[s].”92
The “provide” language encompasses areas where the Constitution or
Acts of Congress are interpreted to grant the judiciary the power to fashion
an entire body of federal common law. For example, the Constitution
provides that “[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”93 Federal courts have
seen this as an implicit grant of power to the federal judiciary to fashion a
body of federal admiralty common law.94 This same logic can be applied to
other bodies of federal common law based on similar provisions in the
Constitution95 or in federal statutes.96
90
91

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (emphasis added).
In common usage, a court “makes” or “creates” federal common law when it develops a
uniform judge-made rule instead of adopting state law as a federal rule of decision. This Comment
uses those terms in that spirit. However, for the sake of analytical precision, it is important to note
that the act of “making” or “creating” federal common law is recognizing that an issue is to be
determined in reference to a federal rule of decision. Thus, a court truly “makes” or “creates”
federal common law both when it develops a uniform judge-made rule and when it adopts state
law as a federal rule of decision.
92 See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) ( Jackson, J., concurring) (“[F]ederal courts may not apply their own notions of the common law at
variance with applicable state decisions except ‘where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States [so] require or provide.’” (second alteration in original)); Burbank, supra note 42, at
759 (arguing that the creation of federal common law must be justified based on the language of
the Rules of Decision Act).
93 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
94 Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639,
1642 (2008).
95 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)
(finding, based on the language of Article III, that the apportionment of water in an interstate
stream is a matter of federal common law); see also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1244 (1988) (identifying other bodies of federal
common law that are justified in reference to “an explicit jurisdictional grant in article III,” such as
interstate boundaries, riparian boundaries, and transactions in which the federal government is a
participant).
96 The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is an example of a federal statute that, as interpreted, provides
for the judiciary to fashion a body of common law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district
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In this way, the “provide” language can be seen as charging the judiciary
to create federal common law when the designated sources of law, as
interpreted, speak to that question directly, whereas the “require” language
can be seen as charging the judiciary to create federal common law when the
designated sources of law, as interpreted, “require” it in order to effect
federal policy.
This Part does not continue to discuss the relatively straightforward
“provide” language. Rather, it focuses on the “require” language to determine when a statute “require[s]” that something other than state law
provide the rule of decision (i.e., when Congress wishes the Court to
develop a uniform judge-made rule).
A. Two Common Misconceptions About Federal Common Law Making—
Preemption and Separation of Powers
In plain English, the RDA is a directive from Congress to all federal
courts to use state law as a federal rule of decision in federal court unless the
Constitution or a federal statute “otherwise require[s].”97 Thus, the RDA is
an instruction from Congress as to when a federal court should use a
uniform judge-made federal rule and when a federal court should use
existing state law as a federal rule.98
The necessary antecedent to Congress providing the Court with such a
directive is that Congress itself has the power to choose which sovereign’s
law should be used as the federal rule of decision in federal court.99 It has
this power under its authority to make laws which “shall be necessary and
proper” for the functioning of the federal courts and for the exercise of its
Article I legislative powers.100
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (recognizing that the ATS provides for the federal judiciary to “recognize
private claims under federal common law for violations of . . . [certain] international law
norm[s]”). But see id. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the ATS is merely a jurisdictional statute that does not authorize the federal
judiciary to create a body of federal common law). In this case, since the federal courts’ interpretation
of the text of the ATS would result in the creation of uniform judge-made rules, the statute would
“provide” for the creation of federal common law.
97 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
98 See Westen & Lehman, supra note 78, at 316 (“[T]he court applies the appropriate state
law . . . because Congress, through the Rules of Decision Act, has chosen to use state law as a
federal rule of decision.” (emphasis added)).
99 If Congress does not have this power, then it cannot possibly direct the Court in the RDA
to determine how to exercise this power. Cf. Merrill, supra note 76, at 11 (“[T]he question of the
power of federal courts to make law should precede questions about the content of that law.”).
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Recognizing Congress’s power to choose whether courts should create a
federal rule or use a state rule as a federal rule in federal court (i.e., power
to promulgate the RDA) is critical to understanding why the Court is
wrong in framing its reverse-Erie cases as preemption cases. Preemption is
an appropriate term only when the “preempted” rule would govern of its
own force in the absence of the supposed “preemptive” rule.101
Going back to first principles (i.e., a world without the RDA), in federal
court, state law does not govern of its own force in the absence of a federal
rule.102 The only reason state law would apply in federal court is because
Congress, which has the independent constitutional power to legislate in
the area, has chosen state law. The ultimate choice between state law and
federal law rests with Congress, and the resultant rule is always a federal rule
of decision regardless of the source of the rule’s content.
Reintroducing the RDA, the only reason state law would apply in federal
court is because the Court has determined, pursuant to Congress’s instruction
in the RDA, that a federal statute does not “require” a uniform judge-made
rule.103 Viewed in this light, the separation of powers concerns that some
scholars express with respect to federal common law making by federal
courts104 lose their force. Although the Court may be exercising congressional
power to make a choice between creating a uniform judge-made rule and
adopting state law as a federal rule, it is doing so as part of a constitutionally
permissible delegation of power.
The RDA represents a delegation by Congress of its power to choose
whether the Court should use state law or a uniform judge-made federal
rule in any given situation. This delegation is permissible as long as it is
accompanied by an “intelligible principle” by which the Court can exercise
101 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (expressly
“supersed[ing]” existing state law “relat[ing] to any employee benefit plan”).
102 The only exception to this proposition is in those rare situations where the Constitution
requires federal courts to apply state law. See Burbank, supra note 42, at 756 & n.99 (“So long as
federal courts exist and have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in which the Constitution requires
them to apply state law, that law may be said without linguistic strain to govern ‘of its own
force.’”).
103 Cf. Westen & Lehman, supra note 78, at 359 (“[H]aving refrained from creating a rule of
decision . . . Congress can be constitutionally presumed to have intended to choose state law.”
(emphasis added)).
104 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1245, 1255 (1996) (“The rise of federal common law is problematic because such law
is . . . in tension with important features of the constitutional structure, particularly . . . the
separation of powers.”); Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 436 (2008) (“Although typically associated
with delegations to agencies, the constitutional principles on which the nondelegation doctrine is
based apply with full force to delegations to courts.”).
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the delegated power.105 The explicit “intelligible principle” which would
make the delegation permissible is the language of the RDA. In the RDA,
Congress directs the Court that it should always use state law as the rule of
decision unless the Constitution or a federal statute “otherwise require[s] or
provide[s].”106 Since the Court is following this intelligible principle from
Congress, rather than engaging in an independent assessment of the merits
of a federal uniform rule versus incorporating state law, there is no separation of powers problem in this regard.107
There may be a residual separation of powers concern with respect to
the fact that, once the Court determines that a federal statute has “required”
a uniform judge-made rule, it must then provide the content of that uniform judge-made rule. However, this concern is not as great as it seems at
first glance. The Court is not developing a rule “untethered to a genuinely
identifiable (as opposed to judicially constructed) federal policy.”108 Rather,
the content of the rule is informed and guided by the general intent of
Congress through its statute.109
Although some may suggest, using nondelegation terms, that the general
intent of Congress is not an explicit “intelligible principle” that can guide
the judiciary’s development of a uniform rule, the Court has previously
been comfortable with implicit intelligible principles in the form of federal
policy.110 There is no reason why the general intent of Congress in a federal
105 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise
the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
107 Cf. Westen & Lehman, supra note 78, at 341 (suggesting that, even if the Court incorrectly
divines that Congress required the creation a uniform judge-made rule, that decision would not be
such an “egregious” abuse of the Court’s statutory interpretation authority to rise to the level of a
separation of powers violation).
108 O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994); see also Burbank,
supra note 42, at 789-90 (“Federal courts are not free to conjure up ‘interests’; rather, they must
tie them to policies already articulated in, or at least articulable from, valid legal prescriptions.”).
109 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451-57
(1957) (developing a federal common law rule providing for specific performance of arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements based on the general intent of Congress in a statute);
supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
738 (1979) (“[I]n fashioning federal principles to govern areas left open by Congress, our function
is to effectuate congressional policy.”).
110 See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (rejecting a claim of
violation of separation of powers in a congressional delegation of power to the SEC where the
intelligible principle was not explicit, but rather was “derive[d] . . . from the purpose of the Act,
its factual background and the statutory context in which [it] appear[ed]”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 416 (1935) (determining whether there was a violation of separation of powers in a
congressional delegation of power to the President by “examin[ing] the context to ascertain if it
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statute cannot be seen as an implicit intelligible principle as part of a
constitutionally permissible delegation of power to the judiciary.111 This
view placates separation of powers concerns about the Court specifying the
content of a uniform judge-made rule.
B. Three Common Misconceptions About the Rules of Decision Act—
“Rules of Decision,” “In Cases Where They Apply,”
and “In the Courts of the United States”
The argument could be made that the RDA does not apply to reverseErie cases because the term “rules of decision” denotes substantive rather
than procedural law. As an initial matter, resort to substance–procedure
labels as a proxy for the meaning of “rules of decision” is imprecise and
distracts from a real discussion of whether the RDA applies.112 It is also
unhelpful because the Court sometimes finds a rule to be both substantive
and procedural.113
In its cases that reference the RDA, the Court does not follow a procedure–
substance construction of the term “rules of decision.” The Court has
implicated the RDA twice when assessing whether state statutes of
limitations conflicted with federal policy.114 While a statute of limitations
furnishes a declaration of policy or a standard of action, which can be deemed to relate to the
[statute] and thus to imply what is not there expressed”); cf. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (“[D]elegation to an
agency can be implicit as well as explicit.”).
111 Professor Thomas Merrill advances two arguments that the separation of powers concerns
in the context of delegations of power to the judiciary are greater than that of delegations to
agencies: (1) agencies, unlike the judiciary, are accountable to the electorate through the President;
and (2) agency decisions are reviewable by the courts. Merrill, supra note 76, at 41 n.182.
However, just as agencies are accountable to the electorate through the President, the federal
judiciary is accountable to the electorate through Congress, which has the power to change the
“intelligible principle” it has given the courts. Moreover, just as agency decisions are reviewable
by the courts, the federal judiciary’s decisions on the creation of common law are reviewable by
Congress. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (noting that Congress always retains the
power to abrogate federal common law).
112 Cf. infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (outlining the dangers of using these labels
in reverse-Erie cases).
113 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) (finding a New York
state rule that allowed its appellate courts to review and set aside excessive jury verdicts to be both
“substantive” and “procedural”); cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) (“[T]he
words ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ themselves . . . do not have a precise content, even (indeed
especially) as their usage has evolved.”).
114 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987)
(“[T]he Rules of Decision Act . . . requires application of state statutes of limitations unless a
timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in federal law should be applied.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 162-63 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that
the RDA applies to a situation where a state statute of limitations conflicts with the vindication of
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skirts the substance–procedure boundary, the Court still implicated the
RDA.115
Rather, scholars have defined a “rule of decision” as “any rule by which
issues in a case are decided.”116 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
“rule of decision” as a “rule, statute, body of law, or prior decision that
provides the basis for deciding or adjudicating a case.”117 Under this definition, any rule, procedural or substantive, qualifies as a rule of decision if it is
the basis for deciding a case. The Court’s statute of limitations cases that
reference the RDA embrace this definition as they were decided in the
lower courts on the basis of the statutes of limitation.
Applying this definition to the Court’s reverse-Erie cases, it appears that
the state rules in question were “rules of decision” in three out of four cases.
In Brown, the state pleading rule was the basis upon which the state courts
dismissed Brown’s case.118 In Dice, the state rule regarding fraudulent
releases was the basis upon which the state courts denied recovery to
Dice.119 In addition, the state practice of allowing a judge to determine
fraud notwithstanding the jury’s verdict for Dice was the basis upon which
he lost the case.120 In Felder, the state notice-of-claim provision was the
basis upon which Felder’s case was dismissed in the state courts.121 However,
in Johnson, the state rule about whether to allow an interlocutory appeal was
not the basis for deciding the case because the appeal was interlocutory—
the case had not been decided yet.122
a federal right); DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983) (recognizing
that the RDA is implicated in determining whether a state statute of limitations should be applied
to a federal cause of action); id. at 174 n.1 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 173-74 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (using the RDA as a basis for borrowing state statute of limitations as a federal rule
of decision).
115 See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 736 (“The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance between, on the one hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substantive claims and, on
the other hand, a combination of its procedural interest in freeing its courts from adjudicating
stale claims and its substantive interest in giving individuals repose from ancient breaches of
law.”).
116 Westen & Lehman, supra note 78, at 366 n.165 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009).
118 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949).
119 342 U.S. 359, 362 (1952).
120 Id. at 363.
121 487 U.S. 131, 152-53 (1988).
122 520 U.S. 911, 922-23 (1997). This Comment nevertheless extracts lessons from Johnson as
to the Court’s conformity (or lack thereof ) to the RDA limit on its power to fashion common law
because the Court did not make a distinction between Johnson and its three other reverse-Erie
cases. It is fair to say that, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the Court believed that
it was operating under the RDA in Johnson just as it was in the other reverse-Erie cases. Cf. infra
notes 135-39 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s federal common law cases that do
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Under this definition of “rules of decision,” the Court’s preoccupation
with “outcome-determination” to decide whether a uniform judge-made
rule is warranted in the reverse-Erie context is puzzling. The Court defined
“outcome-determination” in Johnson as affecting the “ultimate disposition of
the case.”123 This is just another way of saying “the basis for deciding the
case.” Thus, when a state rule is outcome-determinative, it is also necessarily
a rule of decision, and the RDA is then implicated. If a state rule is not
outcome-determinative, then it is not a rule of decision and the RDA is not
implicated.124
The Court’s analysis of outcome-determination thus is not a helpful tool
in assessing Congress’s intent concerning the creation of a uniform judgemade rule or adoption of state law as the federal rule of decision. Rather,
the outcome-determination test is a useful inquiry only for asking whether,
as an initial matter, the RDA is even implicated.
Some legal scholars have also suggested that the language of “in cases
where they apply” limits the RDA’s reach to diversity cases.125 This would
render the RDA inapplicable to reverse-Erie cases, which are, by definition,
federal question cases in state court. The problem is that there is no actual
evidence to support it this argument.126 Furthermore, commentators have
advanced compelling reasons against such a narrow interpretation.127
Finally, some argue that the language stating that the RDA applies only
to “the courts of the United States” renders the RDA inapplicable to state

not reference the RDA can serve as implicit interpretations of it). Thus, the Court’s treatment of
the legal issues in Johnson provides valuable insight into its conformity with the RDA theory of
federal common law making advanced in this Comment.
123 520 U.S. at 921.
124 What the Court should do in a situation where a state rule that is not a rule of decision
and a federal rule conflict, as was the case in Johnson, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
the purposes of this Comment, it suffices to say that the RDA would not be implicated as a
limitation on the power of the Court to fashion a uniform judge-made rule.
125 See David P. Currie, On Blazing Trails: Judge Friendly and Federal Jurisdiction, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 5, 8 n.27 (1984) (characterizing the diversity-only view as a “popular rumor”).
126 See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1895) (rejecting the claim that the RDA
applies only to diversity cases because the RDA “neither contains nor suggests such a distinction”); Westen & Lehman, supra note 78, at 366-68 (stating that neither the RDA nor Erie
jurisprudence support this view).
127 See, e.g., Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 991,
994-95 (1953) (arguing against the diversity-only reading by noting that (1) the First Congress
could have specified that the RDA applied only to diversity cases if it so desired; (2) a diversityonly interpretation would leave the federal courts without a congressional directive on how to
proceed in nondiversity cases; and (3) the federal courts have applied the RDA in nondiversity
cases in the past); cf. supra note 114 and accompanying text (citing federal question cases where the
Court implicated the RDA).
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courts.128 This proposition ignores the widely accepted view that a state
court must decide a matter of federal law as it believes that the U.S.
Supreme Court—which is constrained by the RDA—would decide the
issue.129 In this way, the RDA constrains a state court’s ability to create a
uniform judge-made rule or use state law as a federal rule of decision even
though the RDA’s language does not explicitly constrain state courts.130
With these five misconceptions about federal common law making and
the RDA clarified, we can now examine how the RDA serves as a limit on
federal common law making.
C. The Nature of the RDA Limit on Federal Common Law Making
The Rules of Decision Act has been the subject of renewed scholarly
attention since the Court interpreted it in Erie. The cryptic language of the
RDA has led to divergent theories of how the RDA constrains the ability of
federal courts to create common law.
1. A Troubled RDA Theory of Federal Common Law Making
One theory of the RDA limit on federal common law making focuses on
the Supremacy Clause. Under this theory, federal courts have the authority

128 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 865 (1989).
129 See La Bonte v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 167 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Mass.
1960) (“Since the Supreme Court has not spoken on . . . . [the validity of FELA releases], we are
obliged to decide the question as we think that court would decide it.”); City of Lancaster v.
Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 658-59 (Tex. 1994) (“When deciding issues of federal law, we find
ourselves in the unique role . . . of an intermediate appellate court, anticipating the manner in
which the United States Supreme Court would decide the issue presented.”); Stephen B. Burbank,
Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1559 n.51
(1992) (noting that, since state court decisions on federal common law are reviewable by the
Supreme Court, state courts should decide questions of federal common law as they believe the
Supreme Court would decide those questions); Clermont, supra note 4, at 31-32 (same); Field,
supra note 12, at 890 n.30 (same); cf. Bellia, supra note 14, at 907-08 (arguing that state courts that
“create” federal common law have the authority to do so only “when [they] make[] law as a
necessary consequence of [their] best efforts to apply existing principles of federal law” because
“[t]he specific intent of the Supremacy Clause was to preclude individual states from making their
own judgments of what national policy should be”); Clermont, supra note 4, at 30 (“Sometimes the
state court has to be the very first to enunciate federal law. It has authority to do so, if it decides in
accordance with existing federal law by trying to discern what the federal courts would decide is
the law, rather than by undertaking to formulate federal law either in pursuit of strictly forwardlooking policies that might guide a legislature or in accordance with nonpositivist principles that
might guide a freely law-creating court.”).
130 Cf. infra note 171 and accompanying text (outlining the ways in which Congress can indirectly compel state courts to use substance-specific “procedural” rules).

1282

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1261

to fashion federal common law when the Supremacy Clause “requires.”131
Proponents argue that the Supremacy Clause “requires” the creation of
federal common law when a federal policy is implicated in a court’s choice
to use a state rule or fashion a uniform judge-made rule.132
The basis for a court creating a uniform judge-made rule is that any
conflicting state policy, as expressed in the state rule in question, is subordinate to the federal policy expressed in a federal statute under the Supremacy
Clause. Accordingly, the Supremacy Clause is said to “require” that the
court fashion a uniform judge-made rule.
However, under a plain reading of the text of the Supremacy Clause,
the Supremacy Clause does not subordinate state policy to federal policy
because the Supremacy Clause does not apply to inchoate federal policies.
The Supremacy Clause applies only to federal laws.133 Therefore, the
Supremacy Clause cannot enter the analysis until a law has been formulated.
It is not a source from which a court can plausibly justify the creation of a
law; it is merely a directive to judges that once a federal law has been
created it is supreme.134
Viewed in this light, the Supremacy Clause, as an instruction on how to
treat existing laws, cannot “require” the creation of federal common law in
the way that a statute, which contains substantive law expressing federal
policy, can “require” the creation of a uniform judge-made rule. Additionally,
as a matter of simplicity, why use an extra inferential step to route the
federal policy embodied in a statute through the Supremacy Clause when
the federal statute itself “require[s]” that something other than state law
apply?

131 See Weinberg, supra note 128, at 865 (“[T]he supremacy clause requires courts to . . .
fashion . . . federal case law.”); id. at 870 (“[A]ll courts must work under the federal common law
when the supremacy clause so ‘requires.’”).
132 See id. at 872 (“Thus, before federal common law is fashioned for a case, all that can be said
to be supreme under article VI is inchoate federal policy. But it is supreme nevertheless.”).
133 See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby . . . .” (emphasis added)).
134 See Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979) (“[T]hough [the
Supremacy Clause] is not a source of any federal rights, it does ‘secure’ federal rights by according
them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law. In that sense all federal rights,
whether created by treaty, by statute, or by regulation, are ‘secured’ by the Supremacy Clause.”
(footnote omitted)); Burbank, supra note 129, at 1559 n.51 (“The Supremacy Clause is not a source
of lawmaking power; it merely states that valid and pertinent federal law is supreme.”).
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2. The Correct RDA Theory of Federal Common Law Making
Before delving into the proper RDA theory of federal common law making,
it is important to note that the Supreme Court, by and large, does not
reference the RDA in its federal common law cases.135 Thus, with few
exceptions, the cases cited in this subsection do not purport to construe the
RDA.
Nevertheless, one can sensibly view all of the Court’s federal common
law making cases as implicitly interpreting the “require” language of the
RDA.136 In the few federal common law making cases where members of
the Court have explicitly viewed the RDA as a constraint on the Court,
they have proceeded on the basis that a federal statute “requires” a uniform
judge-made rule where the state rule at issue conflicts with the policy of the
federal statute137—the same test the Court uses in its federal common law
making cases that do not reference the RDA.138 This is not surprising given
the Court’s oft-quoted maxim that the RDA is “no more than a declaration
of what the law would have been without it.”139 Thus, this Comment
proceeds on the basis that, even if the Court does not explicitly reference
the RDA in its federal common law making cases, it is still operating under
its principles and implicitly construing the RDA.
As noted in subsection III.C.1, the proper question for the Court to ask
under an RDA theory of federal common law making is whether Congress,
through a source of positive federal law, required that something other than
state law apply. If Congress had, ex ante, made a determination about
135
136

For rare exceptions to this general proposition, see supra note 114, and infra note 137.
Cf. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 727-30 (1974)
(treating Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), as interpreting the RDA although the cases d0 not reference it).
137 See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983) (concluding
that the “policies and requirements of the underlying [federal] cause of action” “require or
provide” for the creation of a uniform judge-made rule); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,
598 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Rules of Decision Act cases disregard state law where there
is conflict with federal policy, even though no explicit conflict with the terms of a federal statute
[exists] . . . .”); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
(UAW) v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (“[S]tate law
is applied [under the RDA] only because it supplements and fulfills federal policy, and the
ultimate question is what federal policy requires.”).
138 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (“Displacement will
occur only where . . . a significant conflict exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest
and the [operation] of state law.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
139 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1938); see also Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 464 (1831)).
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whether to fashion a uniform rule or incorporate state law as the federal rule
of decision, it would have to take into account two competing principles: (1)
the federal interest in the uniformity of federal law; and (2) the federal140
and state interest in having a state rule govern (i.e., federalism concerns).
Since Congress cannot specify how it would resolve this tension with regard
to every possible state rule that could conflict with its statute, it promulgated
the RDA. To determine whether Congress’s statute “requires” a uniform
judge-made rule on any given issue, the Court must pick up on certain clues
as to how Congress would have decided the issue.
The first step in answering the question is to consider whether “a significant conflict exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law.”141 To determine whether a significant conflict
exists, the Court must identify some kind of “clear and substantial” goal or
policy of the federal legislation with which the state rule conflicts.142 Thus,
the starting point of the RDA inquiry has two components: (1) identifying a
pertinent federal policy; and (2) determining if the state law is in conflict
with that policy.143
Under the proper RDA theory of federal common law making, the more
clear and substantial this federal policy and the more significant the conflict
between the state rule and federal policy, the more likely the statute
requires that something other than state law apply. By the same token, if
there is no clear and substantial federal policy and/or there is no significant
conflict, the statute does not require that something other than state law
apply.
To find the federal policy, the Court looks to Congress’s general intent
in the relevant statute.144 The federal policy is more “clear” (and potentially

140 See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the federal interest in
vertical uniformity of the law).
141 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Robertson, 436 U.S. at 598 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966) (“If there is a federal statute dealing with the general
subject, it is a prime repository of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law.”);
Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 709 (White, J., dissenting).
142 Yazell, 382 U.S. at 352; cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79,
89 (1994); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958) (declining to hold federal
legislation as preempting state law when the policy of the federal legislation was only in “remote”
conflict with the state law).
143 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (“[W]e must . . . determine whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs.”).
144 See Wallis, 384 U.S. at 69; cf. Justin Plaskov, Comment, Geothermal’s Prior Appropriation
Problem, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 299 n.303 (2011) (“While it is most important to determine
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more “substantial”) when it is readily identifiable in the legislative history
of the statute.145 In addition, it is more “clear” (and potentially more
“substantial”) when it has been clearly expressed by Congress in analogous
statutes.146 This is especially true where the Court believes that, in promulgating the analogous statute, Congress weighed the same federal and state
interests implicated in the statute in question.147
If a “clear and substantial” federal policy exists, the inquiry turns to the
level of conflict between the state rule and the federal policy. If there is a
conflict (however small), then there is at least a small federal interest in a
uniform judge-made rule. However, one must be careful not to put the cart
before the horse. The analytically precise inquiry asks first about the
existence of a conflict and then, from this conflict, infers a federal interest in
a uniform judge-made rule—not the other way around.148

if Congress intended to override state law, where a statute is ambiguous as to that specific point,
the general intent of the statute becomes significant.”).
If this discussion of federal policy sounds familiar, it is because it is similar to the test for
whether the Court is creating common law or engaging in statutory interpretation under the
narrow definition of common law. Under the narrow definition of common law, the Court is
creating common law when it bases its decision on the general intent of a statute. See supra note 79
and accompanying text. General intent is essentially another term for the policy behind a statute.
See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1999); Jonathan P. Rich, Note,
The Attorney–Client Privilege in Congressional Investigations, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 145, 157 (1988).
Thus, one can view the Court’s inquiry about the general intent of a statute in reverse-Erie
cases as part of this “significant conflict” inquiry. For examples in the reverse-Erie context where
the Court found a state rule conflicted with the general intent of a statute, see supra notes 81-89
and accompanying text.
145 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-85 (1979) (quoting from the legislative history of a
statute to support a finding that the federal policy is “clear”).
146 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (“Our cases indicate that a
court should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal
rules . . . when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy
choices readily applicable to the matter at hand.”); cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S.
490, 495 (1980) (declining to consider attorney’s fees in a calculation of damages in a FELA action
where FELA was silent on the matter but similar federal statutes explicitly provided for compensation of attorney’s fees).
147 See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983) (“[W]e have available
a federal statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar
to that at stake here—a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any
of the suggested state-law parallels.”).
148 Cf. Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997) (“To invoke the concept
of ‘uniformity,’ however, is not to prove its need.”); O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (“What is fatal to respondent’s position in the present case is that it
has identified no significant conflict with an identifiable federal policy or interest. . . . Uniformity
of law might facilitate the FDIC’s nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state
research and reducing uncertainty—but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified
as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’ rules.”).
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And a simple conflict is not enough—the conflict must be “significant.”
The more significant the conflict, the more likely the Court’s inference that
the statute requires a uniform judge-made rule. There will not be a “significant” conflict when the state law can coexist with minimal disruption to the
federal policy or properly effectuate the federal policy.149
But the Court has been hesitant to find that a statute has “required” a
uniform judge-made rule even when there is a “significant conflict” with a
“clear and substantial” federal policy and, thus, a strong need for a uniform
judge-made rule; such a finding is a necessary but not sufficient condition.150
The federal policy–conflict inquiry is only the first part of the analysis.
The second part of the analysis consists of a variety of federalism inquiries
the Court looks to for clues as to whether the statute does not require that
something other than state law apply even in the face of a significant
conflict with a clear and substantial federal policy.
First, the statute is less likely to have “required” a uniform judge-made
rule where there is a strong state interest in using the state rule. The state
interest is particularly strong in areas of law that are traditionally reserved
to the states.151

149 See Wallis, 384 U.S. at 69-70 (declining to create federal common law where state law was
sufficient to carry out the federal policy of promoting the assignability of mineral leases); id. at 71
(“Apart from the highly abstract nature of this [federal] interest, there has been no showing that
state law is not adequate to achieve it.”).
150 This is likely because the concept of the general intent behind a statute is so nebulous.
Determining the general intent of a statute is a difficult and imprecise task because, by its
definition, the enacting Congress did not precisely lay out the general intent. See Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing doubts as
to the constitutionality of preempting state laws based on “generalized notions of congressional
purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law”).
Nevertheless, the Court must play some role in effectuating the general intent of Congress.
The Court is in a better institutional position than Congress to carry into effect the general intent
of Congress on a day-to-day basis. Cf. Lemos, supra note 104, at 453 (“[A]gencies are better able
than Congress to adapt rules to respond to new information or changed circumstances.”).
Moreover, Congress cannot expressly provide uniform rules whenever a new state rule becomes inconsistent with the general intent of its statute. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372 (1989) (noting that, in an “increasingly complex society,” Congress must sometimes
delegate its power in order to effect its will).
151 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (“[T]he historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (noting that the Court will create federal family common law instead of
using state family law only where a federal policy will “suffer major damage”); De Sylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (observing that family law is traditionally a “matter of state
concern” and should generally supply the federal rule of decision).
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Second, as the Court has noted on occasion, “Congress acts . . . against
the background of the total corpus juris of the states.”152 This implies that the
statute is less likely to have required a uniform judge-made rule where the
state rule occupies a well-developed area of state law.153
Third, Congress is in a better institutional position to legislate than the
Court.154 Thus, the statute is less likely to have required a uniform judgemade rule where the question of fashioning common law touches on a host
of policy considerations (which legislatures are in a more legitimate position
to weigh than courts).155
Finally, the Court has been hesitant to find that the statute required a
uniform judge-made rule where state citizens have predicated their commercial relationships on state law.156 This concern ostensibly carries more
weight in the Court’s determination about Congress’s intent where the state
law has been in place for a long period of time.
Thus, cases where the Court declined to create a uniform judge-made
rule157 can be seen as situations where the federal policy (i.e., general intent
of Congress) was not “clear and substantial” enough to overcome the
federalism-based indicators noted above. In such cases, Congress likely did
152
153

Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (declining to create federal
corporate common law since state corporate law was firmly established).
154 Cf. Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68 (“Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace
state law is primarily a decision for Congress.”).
155 See O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (“Within the
federal system, at least, we have decided that that function of weighing and appraising [policy
considerations] is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who
interpret them.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
156 See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 674 (1979) (“Private landowners rely on
state real property law when purchasing real property . . . . There is considerable merit in not having
the reasonable expectations of these private landowners upset by the vagaries of being located
adjacent to or across from Indian reservations or other property in which the United States has a
substantial interest.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 72829 (1979) (“Finally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.” (emphasis added)); Santa
Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 (“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs
of the corporation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
One might initially consider this factor a part of the inquiry that asks whether the state interest
in using its rule is strong. However, the hesitancy to disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law is, at its heart, a discrete federal interest. See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1949 (2006)
(recognizing that the interest in vertical uniformity of the law is a federal interest); Catherine T.
Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules
Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1229 (2011) (same).
157 See, e.g., supra note 42.

1288

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1261

not intend its statute to “require” the creation of a uniform judge-made
rule. While none of the factors noted above are individually dispositive,158
they contribute to an overall finding that the statute did not “require” the
creation of a uniform judge-made rule.
Viewed in this light, the Court’s determination of Congress’s intent is
based on a sliding scale of factors. If the federal policy is more clear or
substantial, or the conflict between the policy and a state rule is more
significant, the Court will give less weight to the federalism factors identified above. If the federal policy is less clear or substantial, or the conflict
between the policy and a state rule is less significant, the federalism factors
will be accorded more weight.
It is also worth noting that, after the Court’s analysis, Congress always
has the option of overruling the Court. Congress can tell the Supreme
Court that it came to an incorrect determination in finding that a statute
required the creation of federal common law by abrogating the common
law.159
3. Evaluating the Court’s Reverse-Erie Cases Against the Correct
RDA Theory of Federal Common Law Making
The methodology that the Court uses in its reverse-Erie cases does not
explicitly follow the inquiry for the creation of federal common law outlined in subsection III.C.2. The simple explanation for this is that the Court
has not recognized that a reverse-Erie case is a decision about whether or
not to create federal common law, rather than a variant of the Erie problem.
Nonetheless, the Court’s reverse-Erie jurisprudence can fit into the framework for the creation of federal common law outlined above.
As to the first part of the federal common law analysis, the Court considers whether there is a significant conflict between a state rule and a clear

158 Cf. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 (noting that the mere existence of a parallel state law remedy
does not prohibit the Court from creating a federal common law remedy).
159 See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (“[W]e
consistently have emphasized that the federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the
judicial, branch of government; therefore, federal common law is subject to the paramount
authority of Congress.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sergio J. Campos, Erie
as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 1593 (2012) (noting that Congress can
always abrogate common law through legislation); Westen & Lehman, supra note 78, at 339
(suggesting the Act of State Doctrine as an example of Congress abrogating a common law rule
fashioned by the Court); cf. id. at 340 (“When the federal courts . . . misperceive the law as
implicitly expressed through the enactments . . . of the legislature . . . the law they make can be
said to be invalid.”).
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and substantial federal policy in its reverse-Erie cases. The Court has been
faithful to this part of the analysis.
In Brown, the Court implicitly identified the general intent of Congress
in FELA as the promotion of victim compensation.160 It found, as it does in
the federal common law context,161 that the state rule could not coexist with
the federal policy without disrupting it and, thus, that there was a significant conflict between the state rule and Congress’s general intent.162
In Dice, the Court found that the right to a jury trial in the federal system of jurisprudence, with which the state rule conflicted, was so fundamental that Congress drafted FELA with it in mind—that is to say, its
continued vitality was part of Congress’s general intent in the statute.163
The Court found the general intent of the jury requirement in the values
animating the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution,164 just as the Court
finds the general intent of Congress in analogous statutes in the federal
common law setting. Even though the analogous document in Dice was the
Constitution, the general principle applies—looking to a document other
than the statute itself can illuminate Congress’s intent.165
In Felder, the Court found that the state rule conflicted with the general
intent of Congress in § 1983 related to victim’s compensation.166 Finally, in
Johnson, the Court declined to fashion a uniform judge-made rule and
instead used the state rule because it found no general intent of Congress in
§ 1983 about interlocutory appeals.167 Again, it reached this determination
by looking to analogous statutes,168 just as the Court does in the federal
common law context.

160
161
162

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (holding that using the state
rule would lead to federal rights in FELA being “defeated under the name of local practice”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
163 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
164 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (“The right
to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943))). Bailey,
in turn, cited an earlier case, Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752 (1942), which added that the
jury right stemmed from the Seventh Amendment.
Although the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, the Court in Dice recognized
that Congress drafted FELA with the expectation that the value of having a trial by jury, expressed
in the Seventh Amendment, should be protected.
165 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
168 See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 n.12 (1997) (noting that the expression of congressional intent with respect to interlocutory appeals is found in § 1291 rather than in § 1983).
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As to the second part of the federal common law analysis, the Court has
been far less on-point in its reverse-Erie cases. The Court has engaged in
only one of the relevant federalism inquiries—whether a state rule occupies
an area of law that is traditionally reserved to the states.169
In the “procedural” arena (where reverse-Erie cases lie), the area of law
that is traditionally reserved to the states involves transsubstantive procedural rules.170 The federalism concerns implicated by Congress requiring
that a state court use a uniform judge-made rule, rather than a transsubstantive state rule, are significant.171 Such a decision by Congress would displace
a component of the underlying state judicial system.
This concern is absent when Congress requires that a state court use a
uniform judge-made rule rather than a substance-specific172 state rule.173 A
state has a great interest in creating a body of transsubstantive procedural
rules and then applying them in its own courts. This interest is far greater
than the state’s similar interest with respect to narrow substance-specific
procedural rules, an area of law not traditionally reserved to the states.
Thus, one can view the Court’s inquiry into whether the state rule is of
general applicability (i.e., transsubstantive) or narrow applicability (i.e.,
substance-specific) in its reverse-Erie cases as part of this larger inquiry
regarding areas of law traditionally reserved to the states.
Justice Frankfurter was the first member of the Court to engage in the
transsubstantive–substance-specific inquiry by intimating a distinction in

169
170
171

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 (providing a definition of transsubstantive “procedural” rules).
Transsubstantive federal “procedural” rules do not apply in state courts hearing federal
causes of action. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 558 n.102. However, Congress can, and does, override state “procedural” rules with
federal substance-specific “procedural” rules since any substance-specific common law established
by the U.S. Supreme Court derived from a federal statute binds state court judges. See supra note
12. Additionally, in cases where common law does not already exist, a state court hearing a federal
cause of action must create substance-specific common law and thus decline to use a state rule
when it believes the U.S. Supreme Court would do so. See supra note 129. In these two ways,
Congress can indirectly require that a state court use a uniform judge-made “procedural” rule
rather than a state rule.
172 Substance-specific “procedural” rules are rules that apply only to cases in a certain substantive area. A state notice-of-claim requirement for all civil actions against state governmental
officials is an example of a substance-specific rule.
173 Cf. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 145 (1988) (“We . . . cannot accept the suggestion that
this requirement is simply part of the vast body of procedural rules, rooted in policies unrelated to
the definition of any particular substantive cause of action, that forms no essential part of the
cause of action as applied to any given plaintiff.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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his dissent in Dice.174 The Court then fully adopted this inquiry in Felder175
and reaffirmed it later in Johnson.176
Beyond asking whether the state rule occupies an area of law traditionally
reserved to the states, the Court does not engage in any of the other federal
common law making inquiries outlined in subsection III.C.2. Instead, the
Court mistakenly uses three other tests to decide reverse-Erie cases: (1) a
substance-specific state rule discrimination test; (2) a procedural–
substantive distinction; and (3) an outcome-determination test.
The Court first used the substance-specific state rule discrimination test
in Felder by inquiring as to whether a substance-specific state rule discriminated177 against a federal right.178 It continued this error in Johnson.179 This
174 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 368 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting from the Court’s opinion) (“Ohio and her sister
States with a similar division of functions between law and equity are not trying to evade their
duty under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act; nor are they trying to make it more difficult for
railroad workers to recover, than for those suing under local law.”).
Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter, apparently without realizing it, used the language of the
RDA in finding that the Court should use the state rule rather than create federal common law.

[C]ertainly the Employers’ Liability Act does not require a State to have juries for
negligence actions brought under the Federal Act in its courts. Or, if a State chooses
to retain the old double system of courts, common law and equity—as did a good
many States until the other day, and as four States still do—surely there is nothing in
the Employers’ Liability Act that requires traditional distribution of authority for disposing of legal issues as between common law and chancery courts to go by the
board. . . . Nothing in the Employers’ Liability Act or in the judicial enforcement of
the Act for over forty years forces such judicial hybridization upon the States.
Id. at 367-68 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter’s dissent recognizes that there is no basis for
creating common law because Congress, through the statute in question (FELA), did not require
the creation of a uniform judge-made rule. Even though Justice Frankfurter does not explicitly
reference the RDA, this is a perfect example of the long-held view that the RDA is “no more than
a declaration of what the law would have been without it.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 72 n.2 (1938); cf. supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s federal
common law cases that do not reference the RDA can serve as implicit interpretations of it).
The Court in Erie appears to be referring to a federal common law rule, animated by federalism
concerns, which would prescribe the same rule as the RDA. It is important to note that this
principle noted in Erie is not mandated by the Tenth Amendment because reverse-Erie cases occur
in areas where Congress has independent constitutional law making power. See supra notes 99-100
and accompanying text. Therefore, this principle in Erie does not undermine the argument that
reverse-Erie cases are not truly preemption cases. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 173.
176 See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997) (finding that the state rule was “a neutral
state Rule regarding the administration of the state courts”); id. at 919 (“The States . . . have great
latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
177 The Court and this Comment use the term “discrimination” to refer to a state rule that
applies only to the type of claim that the federal statute in question authorizes. See Felder, 487
U.S. at 141-42 (“[T]he notice provision discriminates against the federal right. While the State
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inquiry is not a component of the first part of federal common law analysis.
Whether a state rule discriminates against a federal right has no bearing on
whether it significantly conflicts with a “clear and substantial” federal
policy. A state rule that applies broadly to a wide range of causes of action
can easily conflict significantly with a “clear and substantial” federal policy
and vice versa.
Under the second part of the federal common law analysis, as this
Comment notes, substance-specific state rules, like the rule in Felder, do not
occupy an area of law traditionally reserved to the states.180 And the Court
has not used this substance-specific inquiry in the normal federal common
law making context in order to determine whether a statute required the
Court to fashion a uniform judge-made rule.
The Court also mistakenly engages in an inquiry about whether the federal or state rule is one of “procedure” or “substance” to determine whether
to follow the state rule.181 The Court often applies this test by stating that it
is well-settled that a rule is either “substantive” or “procedural.”182 Under
the Court’s view, the state interest in having state procedural laws govern
categorically outweighs the federal interest in a uniform judge-made
procedural rule and vice versa.
Under an RDA approach, one might argue that this inquiry could be
relevant as a proxy for congressional intent. Under this view, the Court
would always presume that Congress’s statute did not require that something other than state procedural rules apply and that Congress’s statute did
require that something other than state substantive rules apply. Under this
affords the victim of an intentional tort two years to recognize the compensable nature of his or
her injury, the civil rights victim is given only four months to appreciate that he or she has been
deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”).
178 See id. at 146 (“Here, the notice-of-claim provision most emphatically does discriminate
in a manner detrimental to the federal right: only those persons who wish to sue governmental
defendants are required to provide notice within such an abbreviated time period.”). But see id. at
160 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the state rule “applies to all actions against municipal
defendants, whether brought under state or federal law” and thus is not discriminatory).
179 See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918 n.9 (“Unlike the notice-of-claim rule at issue in [Felder], [the
state rule] does not target civil rights claims against the State.”).
180 The exception to this proposition is in areas of unique state interest, such as family law
and corporate law.
181 See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411 (1985) (“FELA cases adjudicated
in state courts are subject to state procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them is
federal.”); Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1915) (“As long as the question
involves a mere matter of procedure . . . the state court can . . . follow their own practice even in
the trial of suits arising under the Federal law.”).
182 See St. Louis, 470 U.S. at 411 (“[I]t is settled that the propriety of jury instructions concerning the measure of damages in an FELA action is an issue of ‘substance’ determined by
federal law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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view, Congress would have made this determination based on federalism
concerns.
Other than the glaring initial issue that Congress could easily have included the procedural–substantive language in the RDA if it so chose,183
there are fundamental problems with engaging in this inquiry. Procedure
and substance alone are not good proxies for federalism concerns,184 and
reducing complex congressional policymaking to such simplistic labels
(absent congressional instruction to do so)185 risks undermining the values
of federalism safeguarded by the RDA federal common law making analysis
outlined above.
A procedural state rule can significantly conflict with a “clear and substantial” federal policy just as a substantive state rule may significantly
conflict with a federal policy. It is better to conduct the federal common law
making analysis that this Comment outlines because that analysis focuses on
congressional intent in a federal statute and the very federalism concerns
judges express when they use the substance and procedure labels.
Moreover, labels like “procedure” and “substance” are easily capable of
manipulation by hostile state court judges,186 or, at the very least, are
defined differently by different judges. As the Court has stated on many
occasions in the context of Erie cases, it helps to think about procedure–
substance labels only in reference to the underlying goals of classifying a
rule as one or the other.187 However, unlike in the Erie context, the Court
183 The Rules Enabling Act is evidence that Congress, when it desires to make the application of federal or state law depend on a distinction between substance and procedure, knows how
to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district
courts . . . . Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” (emphasis
added)).
184 See Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own “Laws,” 64
TEX. L. REV. 1, 63 (1985) (“The substance versus procedure test arguably undermines rather than
advances the values of federalism by deprecating deliberate . . . legislative policy based on this
idea . . . .”); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941 (1991) (“[T]he
appropriate allocation of authority in a federal union cannot be made by reference to the
substance–procedure distinction. To the extent that respect for state autonomy is important to
preserve through federal judicial conformity with state law, that autonomy is just as easily
undermined by independent federal procedure as it is by independent federal substantive law.”
(footnote omitted)).
185 See supra note 183 (noting that Congress, in the Rules Enabling Act, demonstrated that it
has the ability to prescribe rulemaking based on distinctions between “procedure” and “substance”
when it so chooses).
186 See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (discussing the concern that state judges
may improperly narrow the breadth of federal rights).
187 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“Matters of ‘substance’ and
matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide
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has never made a similar cautionary statement about state court judges
using procedure and substance labels in the reverse-Erie context as a
substitute for a meaningful analysis of congressional intent regarding the
creation of common law.
The likely reason for the Court’s use of this procedure–substance test is
that the term “reverse-Erie” influences the Court to apply the principles of
Erie188 to a situation that is merely a decision about whether or not to create
federal common law.189
Finally, the Court has also used an outcome-determination test to decide whether it should follow a state rule or create common law in its
reverse-Erie cases. While the Court did not reference the test in either
Brown or Dice, it adopted the test in Felder190 and used it again in Johnson.191
However, under the federal common law making analysis outlined
above, the Court has recognized that a state statute being outcomedeterminative does not make it inconsistent with a federal statute.192 The
use of the outcome-determination test in the reverse-Erie context is a poor
substitute for the real conflict analysis required when making federal
common law. Thus, the Court should decline to use this outcomedetermination test in the reverse-Erie context.

cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same
key-words to very different problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same
invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is
used.”).
188 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-66 (1965) (applying the procedure–substance
test as part of the Erie doctrine).
189 Cf. Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 190917 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reverse-Erie jurisprudence is influenced by the
Court’s implicit and incorrect view that the twin aims of Erie should guide state courts facing
reverse-Erie problems). Following the Supreme Court’s mistaken lead, both state courts and
scholars frequently implicate the concerns of the Erie doctrine when discussing the reverse-Erie
problem. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1272-73 (2012) (arguing against freedom for state court judges in
interpreting federal law in reverse-Erie cases because it would implicate Erie’s concerns about
disuniformity of the law and forum shopping).
190 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (“[B]ecause its enforcement in such actions
will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in § 1983 litigation based solely on
whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, we conclude that the state law is pre-empted
when the § 1983 action is brought in a state court.”).
191 See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918-20 (1997) (finding a state rule regarding interlocutory appeals not to be outcome-determinative because a party could have the subject of the
interlocutory appeal reviewed at the conclusion of the trial).
192 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 (1979) (“[A] state statute cannot be considered
‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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As noted earlier, the outcome-determination test is relevant in the
standard federal common law making context (and, by extension, the
reverse-Erie context) only in evaluating whether the RDA applies.193 Again,
the likely reason for the Court’s use of this outcome-determination test is
that it is influenced by the term “reverse-Erie” to apply the principles of
Erie194 to a mere federal common law making decision. As Justice O’Connor
noted in her dissent from the Court’s decision in Felder, the use of the
outcome-determination test is “based on a sort of upside-down theory of
federalism, which the Court attributes to Congress on the basis of no
evidence at all.”195
Under the RDA approach that this Comment advocates, Congress has
expressed how its wishes to treat reverse-Erie problems. Congress commands the Court to use state law unless a federal statute otherwise “requires.” And the Court should determine whether a federal statute
otherwise requires by conducting the federal common law making analysis
outlined above and not through the outcome-determination test.
IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATE COURTS
FACING REVERSE-ERIE PROBLEMS
This Part lays out an analytical framework for state courts to use when
tackling reverse-Erie problems in the fourth and fifth categories—where an
inferior federal court has fashioned or endorsed federal common law or
where a state rule conflicts with the interests inherent in a federal statute
(i.e., the creation of federal common law may be justified where it does not
already exist). This Part then evaluates current state court practice against
this framework.
A. Where an Inferior Federal Court Has Established
Federal Common Law
Federal common law can be developed by three federal bodies—the
U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. court of appeals, and a U.S. district court. A
state court is bound to apply pertinent federal common law fashioned or
endorsed by the Supreme Court because the Court theoretically acts only

193 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (equating the terms “rule of decision” and
“outcome-determinative” to note that the RDA only applies in cases where the state rule in
question is outcome-determinative).
194 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (formulating the outcomedetermination test as an evolution of the Erie doctrine).
195 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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within its statutory limits (i.e., the RDA) when fashioning a rule of common law.196
The more interesting case arises where a federal court of appeals has
established or endorsed pertinent federal common law. The following
hypothetical case is an illustration of a situation in which a state court
would be confronted with “pertinent” federal common law established by a
federal court of appeals. A federal court of appeals hears a case brought
under federal statute XYZ in which the defendant argues for the application
of state A’s notice-of-claim provision, and the plaintiff argues that the
application of state A’s notice-of-claim provision would thwart the remedial
goals of federal statute XYZ. The federal court of appeals rules in favor of
the plaintiff, and state A’s notice-of-claims provision is held not to apply to
cases brought under federal statute XYZ.
In a subsequent unrelated case, a plaintiff brings an action in a court of
state A under federal statute XYZ (which does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts).197 As in the prior case, the defendant argues for
the application of state A’s notice-of-claim provision, and the plaintiff
argues that that the application of state A’s notice-of-claim provision would
thwart the remedial goals of federal statute XYZ.
The court of state A is not bound to accept the federal court of appeals’
determination that the state notice-of-claim provision thwarts the remedial
goals of federal statute XYZ.198 However, the federal court of appeals
considered precisely the same question with which the court of state A is
now faced. It is in this sense that the federal common law fashioned by the
federal court of appeals is “pertinent.”
Another example is the Seventh Circuit’s decision in what eventually
became the U.S. Supreme Court case Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc.199 In Kamen, the Seventh Circuit determined that the demand requirement for a stockholder derivative suit that was filed under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (ICA), a federal statute, should be determined in
reference to federal law.200 Declining to incorporate Maryland state law as
the federal rule of decision, the Seventh Circuit fashioned a uniform judgemade rule that the futility of making a demand is not a valid excuse for
failure to make a demand.201

196
197
198
199
200
201

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
500 U.S. 90 (1991)
908 F.2d 1338, 1342 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1347.
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If the Supreme Court had not granted the petition for writ of certiorari
in Kamen, the uniform judge-made rule that the Seventh Circuit had
adopted would have stood. Any future stockholder derivative action under
the ICA filed in Maryland state court would have presented the Maryland
state court with the precise question that the Seventh Circuit faced; namely,
whether the ICA “requires” a uniform judge-made rule defining a demand
requirement or whether the federal rule of decision for a demand requirement can incorporate Maryland state law.202 It is in this sense that the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Kamen would have been “pertinent” to such a
case in Maryland state court.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that scholars agree that state
courts, being coordinate rather than inferior to federal courts, are not
constitutionally bound to follow federal common law fashioned or endorsed
by a federal court of appeals.203 This rule does not, however, preclude a
state court from treating a federal court’s interpretation of federal law as
persuasive.204 As a normative matter, state courts should accord pertinent
federal common law fashioned or endorsed by a federal court of appeals a
presumption of correctness and refuse to follow the common law only
where they believe the creation of the common law was clearly erroneous.
There is a federal interest in uniformity looming over all reverse-Erie
questions. Even if a state court would decide not to fashion common law
after conducting the same analysis as a federal court of appeals, once the
federal common law is established by a federal court of appeals and has been
applied by federal courts, the federal interest in uniformity is much greater
than it was before. In the case where no federal common law exists at all
202 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (2012) (providing for concurrent state court jurisdiction for cases
brought under the ICA).
203 See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any
other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to
a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey
Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 (1994) (noting that, pursuant to Article III,
state courts are not constitutionally bound to follow the decision of an inferior federal court
because the inferior federal courts exercise no appellate review over the decisions of state courts);
Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: Contrasting Approaches to Applying
Court of Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings and Erie State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REV. 1, 17-19 (2006) (observing that twenty-nine states do not treat federal courts of appeals’
decisions on federal law as binding). But see Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991)
(expressing doubts as to the “wisdom” of the view that state courts should not consider themselves
bound by a decision of a federal court of appeals).
204 See generally Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa. 2004) (noting that
a vast majority of state supreme courts view a decision of an inferior federal court as “persuasive,
but not binding, authority”).
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(i.e., the fifth category of reverse-Erie), the state rule is conflicting only
with potentially vague notions of general intent behind a statute;205 the
federal interest in the uniformity of law is weaker here as it is examined
only in reference to this conflict.
However, in the case where federal common law has been established by
a federal court of appeals, the state rule conflicts with the general intent of
Congress and existing federal common law, rendering the federal concern
with disuniformity in the law more acute.206 Presumably, this disuniformity
concern is even greater where the federal common law has been in place for
a long time,207 the lower federal courts are in agreement,208 or the common
law in question was developed or endorsed by the state court’s coordinate
federal court of appeals.209
The disuniformity concern becomes even more troubling when one considers that the only mechanism for review of a state court’s decision refusing
to recognize federal common law that was endorsed or created by a federal
court of appeals (a federal–state “split” case) is U.S. Supreme Court
certiorari review. Procedural requirements, such as the requirement that a
case must first reach the highest state court “in which a decision could be
had,”210 prevent many of these cases from being reviewed by the Court.211
205
206

See generally supra note 150.
Cf. Red Maple Props. v. Zoning Comm’n, 610 A.2d 1238, 1242 n.7 (Conn. 1992) (“It
would be a bizarre result if this court [adopted one standard] when in another courthouse, a few
blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the Second Circuit rule, required [a different
standard]. We do not believe that . . . Congress . . . intended to create such a disparate treatment
of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a federal or state forum.” (citation and internal
quotations marks omitted)); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 403 (Ill. 1996)
(noting that the interpretation of a federal statute by federal courts is binding on Illinois courts in
order to give the statute uniform application).
207 The longer the federal common law has existed in the federal court of appeals without
being overruled by the Supreme Court or abrogated by Congress, see supra note 159, the more
likely that the federal court of appeals divined Congress’s intent correctly. Thus, the longer the
federal common law has existed, the more presumptive validity it has, and the more weight the
state court should give it.
208 See State v. Riggs, 568 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (“Michigan adheres to the
rule that a state court is bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts regarding federal
questions when there is no conflict. . . . However, where an issue has divided the circuits of the
federal court of appeals, this Court is free to choose the most appropriate view.”); Hall, 851 A.2d
at 864 (noting that Alabama, California, and Illinois treat the decisions of lower federal courts as
binding where the decisions of those courts are “numerous and consistent”).
209 Where the federal courts of appeals are split on an issue, the presumption of correctness
is called into doubt and the state court should engage in the analysis proposed in Section IV.B.
See, e.g., Axess Int’l, Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 1, 7-8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (employing
an independent analysis of whether to create federal common law where the Second Circuit and
Eleventh Circuit were in disagreement about whether federal common law should exist).
210 See supra note 6.
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This problem is compounded by the Court’s shrinking docket and reticence
in taking cases from state supreme courts. 212
Moreover, federal courts are experts on federal law213 and at divining
Congress’s intent.214 They fashion federal common law and conduct inquiries
as to congressional intent on a daily basis. This fact is especially relevant in
the reverse-Erie context where a court must determine whether a state rule
conflicts with the nebulous general intent of Congress in a federal statute.215
The inquiry about whether a statute requires that something other than
state law apply is a largely intent-driven inquiry.216 Presumably, state courts
would be at a comparative disadvantage to federal courts in reaching an
accurate answer to that question of congressional intent.
Applying a presumption of correctness would also alleviate much of the
concern that state judges are hostile to federal rights.217 This concern is
211 See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“One might argue that this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments
in cases arising under federal law can be depended upon to correct erroneous state-court decisions
and to insure that federal law is interpreted and applied uniformly. However, as any experienced
observer of this Court can attest, Supreme Court review of state courts, limited by docket
pressures, narrow review of the facts, the debilitating possibilities of delay, and the necessity of
deferring to adequate state grounds of decision, cannot do the whole job.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
212 Cf. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (explaining that
granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts to hear a cause of action leads to more uniform
application of the law due to the Supreme Court’s limited docket); see generally Owens & Simon,
supra note 7, at 1225-63 (discussing the Court’s shrinking docket, possible reasons for it, and its
implications).
213 The Court has noted in the past that deciding a federal case in federal court brings “the
desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the
assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.” Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383
(1996); AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1968) (“The federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in
the interpretation and application of federal law which would be lost if federal questions were
given to state courts.”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 (1988)
(recognizing that federal courts have a greater institutional competence than state courts in
developing federal law).
214 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 827 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he federal courts are comparatively more skilled at interpreting and applying federal law, and are much more likely
correctly to divine Congress’ intent in enacting legislation.”).
215 See generally supra note 150.
216 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
217 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the state tribunals
cannot be supposed to be impartial speaks for itself.”); David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected
Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 328 (1978) (“[F]ederal question jurisdiction [is based] upon [a]
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particularly acute in the reverse-Erie context because the concept of general
intent is so nebulous. State judges can claim that Congress did not “require”
a uniform judge-made rule in its statute without being unambiguously
wrong. It is precisely this area on the boundary of the federal right (i.e.,
where the Court would look to the general intent of the statute) that a state
court judge would be most hostile to “extending” a federal right.
There is some evidence that Congress considers this hostility concern
salient as well. Justice Brennan has attributed the hostility concern to
Congress’s decision to vest federal courts with original jurisdiction over
federal question cases in the first instance.218 Scholars have also attributed
this hostility concern to Congress’s promulgation of the federal statute that
provides for Supreme Court review of state court decisions.219
Finally, simply as a matter of comity, it is desirable to have state courts
respect the decisions of federal courts on matters of federal law.220 As an
interesting analogy, the clearly erroneous standard of review has long been
invoked when comity is an important value of the reviewing court.221 For
fear of state court hostility to or misunderstanding of federal rights.”); Ethan J. Leib, Localist
Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 924 (2013) (“[N]otwithstanding their oath to
uphold the federal Constitution, state judges are generally allegiant to the state rather than the
federal government in the “reverse-Erie” context.”); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158 (1953) (“Presumably judges selected and paid by the
central government, with tenure during good behavior—and that determined by the Congress—
and probably even somewhat insulated by a separate building, are more likely to give full scope to
any given Supreme Court decision, and particularly ones unpopular locally, than are their state
counterparts. By the same token, should a district judge fail, or err, a more sympathetic treatment
of Supreme Court precedents can be expected from federal circuit judges than from state appellate
courts.” (footnote omitted)).
218 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 827 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some commentators have also
suggested that Congress has considered the general federal–state “split” problem as serious enough
to warrant vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts for certain federal causes of action.
See, e.g., Louis Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (1960)
(suggesting the same with regards to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
219 See Mishkin, supra note 217, at 158 n.10 (“The statutory provisions for review by the Supreme Court of state court decisions have always reflected a fear that state judges might be prone
to narrow unduly the scope of national power.”).
220 See Littlefield v. State Dep’t of Human Servs., 480 A.2d 731, 737 (Me. 1984) (“[E]ven
though only a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is the supreme law of the land
on a federal issue . . . in the interests of existing harmonious federal–state relationships, it is a wise
policy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision of its federal
circuit court on . . . a federal question.”).
221 It is only an analogy because, in the cases that follow this proposition, the reviewing court
had direct appellate jurisdiction over the court being reviewed and thus its decision bound the
lower court. Cf. supra note 203 and accompanying text (recognizing that state courts are not
constitutionally bound to follow the decisions of inferior federal courts). This Comment argues
that, only as a matter of sound policy, should state courts presume the correctness of the decisions of
federal courts of appeals on matters of federal common law.
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example, in Bonet v. Texas Co., the Court used a clear error standard in
reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on matters of
local Puerto Rico law.222
More recently, the Third Circuit has allowed the nascent Supreme
Court of the Virgin Islands, over which it exercises certiorari review,223 to
disregard Third Circuit case law interpreting local Virgin Islands law as
long as the interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands of its
local law is not manifestly erroneous.224 The Third Circuit based its standard on the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard in Bonet.225 The Supreme Court
noted that the standard of review in Bonet was premised on “the deference
due [to] interpretations of local law by . . . local courts.”226 Stripped down
to its essence, the standard used by the Court in Bonet is the product of
Sovereign 1 (the United States) deferring to the decisions of Sovereign 2
(Puerto Rico) on Sovereign 2’s local matters when Sovereign 1 is not
compelled to defer.
Similarly, in a reverse-Erie case, a state court (Sovereign 1) would be
deferring to the decisions of a federal court of appeals (Sovereign 2) on
matters of federal common law (Sovereign 2’s local matters) by refusing to
follow the decision only if it is clearly erroneous. As in Bonet, the state court
is in a situation where it is not compelled to defer to federal law.227
However, despite the foregoing reasons for applying a presumption of
correctness to the decision of a federal court of appeals with respect to
federal common law, it is important that the state court be able to ignore
the decision if it finds that it is clearly erroneous. In such a situation, the
state court would necessarily have to come to the conclusion that the U.S.
Supreme Court would come out the opposite way from the federal court of
222
223

308 U.S. 463, 471 (1940).
See 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (2006) (establishing relations between the Third Circuit and the
courts of the Virgin Islands).
224 See Defoe v. Phillip, 702 F.3d 735, 744 (3d Cir. 2012). The “manifest error” standard is
another term for the “clearly erroneous” standard; see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 652 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (equating the terms “clear error” and “manifest error”); Bonet, 308
U.S. at 471 (“For to justify reversal in such cases, the error must be clear or manifest; the
interpretation must be inescapably wrong; the decision must be patently erroneous.”).
225 Defoe, 702 F.3d at 744. The First and Ninth Circuits have also used this standard of review
in similar situations based on Bonet. See, e.g., Haeuser v. Dep’t of Law, 368 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2004) (using a manifest error standard of review in reviewing the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Guam on matters of local law); C. Brewer P.R., Inc. v. Corchado, 303 F.2d 654, 654 (1st
Cir. 1962) (using a manifest error standard of review in reviewing the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico on matters of local law).
226 Bonet, 308 U.S. at 470.
227 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

1302

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1261

appeals. Since clear error is such a demanding standard, the state court
would have to be almost certain that the Supreme Court would come out the
opposite way. This near certainty would tip the scale and invoke the state
court’s duty to decide the way it believes the Supreme Court would,228
overcoming the presumption of correctness accorded to the federal court of
appeals.
Although state courts should presume correctness when it comes to the
federal court of appeals, federal common law established by a federal
district court should not be given the same presumption of correctness by a
state court.229 A similar presumption runs the risk of introducing disuniformity
into the law—a result antithetical to the goal of the federal legislation.
A decision of a district court does not bind the same district court, a
district court in the same state, or a court of appeals.230 Moreover, a district
court often does not have the final word on a point of law, especially on
something as drastic as adopting a new uniform judge-made rule that is a
likely subject for an appeal.
B.

Where No Federal Court Has Established
Federal Common Law

As noted above, a state court considering whether to create federal
common law in light of a conflict between a state rule and a federal scheme
of rights must do so only where it believes the U.S. Supreme Court would
create common law.231 In undertaking this task, the state court would have
to take into account limitations on the Supreme Court’s power, such as the
RDA.232 Based on the analysis in subsection III.C.2 regarding the situations
in which the Supreme Court is likely to find that a federal statute requires
that something other than state law apply, this Comment proposes the
following analytical framework for state courts to use.
First, a state court should determine if the RDA would be implicated in
the Supreme Court’s federal common law determination. This analysis
involves a determination about whether the state rule in question is a “rule

228
229

See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mills v. Monroe Cnty., 451 N.E.2d 456, 457 (N.Y. 1983) (applying a state noticeof-claim statute in a § 1981 action after disagreeing with the decisions of New York federal district
courts that the state statute was in conflict with the policy embodied in the federal statute).
230 See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1991); Caminker, supra note 203, at
825 & n.31 (citing cases for this principle).
231 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
232 See Burbank, supra note 129, at 1559 n.51.
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of decision.” As noted earlier, this phrase essentially asks whether the state
rule is outcome-determinative.233
If the RDA is implicated, the state court should look for any specific
intent of Congress with respect to the conflict between the state rule and
federal statute in the federal statute’s legislative history.234 If specific intent
from Congress exists as to whether the Court should or should not use the
state rule, then all that is taking place is statutory interpretation (i.e.,
interpretation of the language of the federal statute).235 If there is specific
congressional intent to interpret a federal statute in a way that cannot
accommodate the operation of the state rule, then the federal statute surely
requires that something other than state law apply and the analysis ends.
If a state court is satisfied that there is no relevant specific intent, it
should endeavor to ascertain any relevant general intent behind the federal
statute. The state court can find this general intent in the statute in question, the legislative history of the statute in question, or analogous statutes.236 The goal is to determine if the state rule is in conflict with a “clear
and substantial” federal policy.
As we have already seen, the greater the conflict between the state rule
and the federal policy, and the more “clear and substantial” the federal
policy, the more likely it is that the statute should be deemed to require a
uniform judge-made rule. But if the state rule can coexist with the federal
policy with minimal disruption or if it actually accomplishes the federal
policy, then the statute should not be deemed to require a uniform judgemade rule.237 As noted earlier, this federal policy and conflict inquiry is only
half of the required analysis.

233 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. For an example of a state rule that was not
outcome-determinative, see text accompanying supra note 122.
234 For example, specific intent would exist if Congress had considered including a notice-ofclaim requirement in § 1983 actions but then explicitly rejected such a requirement as inconsistent
with the goals of § 1983. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483 (1979) (“Attention must be
paid as well to what Congress did not do.”); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 181-82 (1978)
(finding congressional intent in the Endangered Species Act to protect endangered species at great
cost after Congress had considered and rejected a bill providing for the protection of endangered
species whenever “practicable”); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (declining to
create a federal common law cause of action against federal officials for abuse of power where
Congress had considered creating a statutory cause of action and refused to do so). But see Malone
v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 515-16 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (considering “what
Congress did not do” to be a mere “inference[]” insufficient to override Congress’s general intent
in a statute).
235 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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The state court must also determine whether there are any signs that the
statute does not require that something other than state law apply. The
state court should ask the following questions: Does the state rule occupy an
area of state law that is well developed?238 Does the decision to create a
uniform judge-made rule touch on delicate federal policy considerations?239
Have state citizens predicated their commercial relationships on the state
rule’s application to disputes?240
Finally, the state court should ask if a conflict between the federal policy
and state rule arises in an area of traditional state regulation (i.e., within the
state’s traditional police power)?241 A subsidiary question that is relevant in
a reverse-Erie case is whether the state rule is of general (i.e., transsubstantive) or narrow (i.e., substance-specific) applicability.242 The state court
should not, however, use a distinction between procedure and substance as a
proxy for the strength of federalism concerns.243
The ultimate goal here is for the state court to come to a reasoned and
principled conclusion, based on the Supreme Court doctrine, as to when a
federal statute requires that something other than state law apply.
C. Evaluating Current State Court Practice Against the
Proposed Analytical Framework
Before proceeding to evaluate state court practice against the proposed
analytical framework, it is important to note that state courts do not
uniformly treat existing Supreme Court reverse-Erie precedent at a methodological level. State courts seemingly take their cue from the Supreme
Court’s confusing244 and contradictory245 jurisprudence in the reverse-Erie
area.
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
See Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s articulation of the contours of [reverse-Erie] analysis has not always been a model
of clarity . . . .”).
The Court has, on different occasions, used a substance–procedure distinction, see supra note
181, a discrimination test, see supra notes 177-79, an outcome-determination test, see supra notes 5960 & 69, and a transsubstantive–substance-specific state rule distinction, see supra notes 56 & 68.
The only area where the Court has been consistent in its reverse-Erie cases is in its determination,
albeit implicitly rather than explicitly, of whether the state rule is in significant conflict with a
clear and substantial federal policy. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text; cf. Jordan,
supra, at 1775 (“[T]he consistent focus [of reverse-Erie analysis] has been on the substantiality of
the federal . . . rule at issue.”).
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The three divergent ways that state courts deal with Supreme Court
precedent in the reverse-Erie area provide evidence of this lack of uniform
treatment. Courts either (1) use only certain parts of the analysis from a
reverse-Erie case;246 (2) use only the analysis from the reverse-Erie case that
is closest in facts to the state court case;247 or (3) use the analysis from the
most recent Supreme Court reverse-Erie case.248 This lack of uniformity in
state court treatment of reverse-Erie precedent leads to disparate treatment
for similarly situated parties in different states—a disturbing outcome.
Moving beyond state court mistreatment of existing reverse-Erie precedent at a methodological level, many state courts engage in an independent
balancing of interests test that pits the federal interest in a uniform judgemade rule against the state’s interest in having its rule apply.249 This inquiry
is mistaken since the state court’s only duty here, like the duty of a federal
court in a normal federal common law case, is to determine whether Congress “required” a uniform judge-made rule in its statute.250
Intimately related to this mistaken analysis is perhaps the most widespread (and demonstrably incorrect251) practice in which state courts
engage—explicitly (and sometimes implicitly) deciding that “procedural”
245 In its four seminal reverse-Erie cases, the Court has referenced only one scholarly article—Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
508 (1954)—which discusses state court enforcement of federal rights by noting that “federal law
takes the state courts as it finds them.” In a move typical of the Court’s jurisprudence in the area,
it expressly rejected Professor Hart’s proposition in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988), by
declaring that it “ha[d] no place under [its] Supremacy Clause analysis,” only to expressly endorse
the proposition in Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997), nine years later.
246 See, e.g., Blount v. Stroud, 877 N.E.2d 49, 59-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (engaging in an
extensive Felder analysis of whether a state rule discriminated against a federal right, but not
engaging in an outcome-determination analysis mandated by the same case), rev’d on other grounds,
904 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2009).
247 See, e.g., Bean v. S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., 709 S.E.2d 99, 107-09 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (deciding a reverse-Erie problem about the validity of a FELA release based solely on Dice).
248 See, e.g., Denari v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. Rptr. 261, 265-68 (Ct. App. 1989) (deciding
a reverse-Erie problem about a state privilege rule based solely on Felder).
249 See, e.g., Mills v. Monroe Cnty., 451 N.E.2d 456, 457-58 (N.Y. 1983) (finding that New
York’s interest in having a notice-of-claim statute for § 1981 actions was “important” and was
“override[n]” only when a § 1981 suit was brought to “vindicate a public interest”); Axess Int’l,
Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co, 30 P.3d 1, 7-8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (balancing Washington’s interest
in having a statute that awards attorney’s fees to an insured who must litigate to establish coverage
against the federal interest in a uniform judge-made rule in an admiralty case); cf. Clermont, supra
note 4, at 33 (“[T]he lower courts . . . balance the state’s interests in having its legal rule applied in
state court on this issue in this case against the federal interests in having federal law displace the
rule of this particular state . . . .”).
250 Cf. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (“The relative importance to the State of its
own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our
Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.”).
251 See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
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state law will always govern in a federal action in state court.252 Under the
state court’s view, the state’s interest in having its procedural laws govern
categorically outweighs the federal government’s interest in a uniform
judge-made rule.
In basing reverse-Erie decisions on characterizing a state rule as either
procedural or substantive, the state courts can find authority in Supreme
Court decisions.253 State courts mirror the Supreme Court’s bare assertions
that a federal rule is “procedural” or “substantive” by citing to their own
decisions about whether the state rule in question is “substantive” or
“procedural” and using the state rule if it is “procedural.”254 The error in
this analysis is the same error that the Supreme Court makes when it
conducts the procedural–substantive analysis. Procedural state laws can be
in deep conflict with “clear and substantial” federal policy just as much as
substantive state laws can. The labels of procedure and substance are
capable of manipulation and have no bearing on the state court’s task.
The better analysis asks if the state rule is transsubstantive or substancespecific. These labels are a better proxy for Congress’s intent of creating a
uniform judge-made rule because they are not subject to manipulation like
the terms “procedure” and “substance.” Moreover, the state will always have
a strong interest in having its transsubstantive rules followed in its courts,
and thus it is less likely that a federal statute requires something other than
the transsubstantive rule to be applied.

252 See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 548 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Cal. 1976) (“[T]he filing of a claim for
damages is more than a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendants, in short, an integral part of plaintiff’s cause of action.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Dunn v. St. Louis–S.F. Ry. Co., 621 S.W.2d 245, 254
(Mo. 1981) (en banc) (“[T]he form of instructions and manner in which the substantive law is
submitted to the jury in an F.E.L.A. case are procedural matters governed by state law.”); Roberts
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 688 S.E.2d 178, 184 (Va. 2010) (“Nor will applying the Virginia rule affect
the ‘rights and obligations of the parties’ under the procedural/substantive rubric.” (citation and
internal quotations omitted)).
253 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, in the reverse-Erie context,
the Supreme Court has not been explicit in cautioning courts about using labels like “procedure”
or “substance” as it has in the Erie context. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Ind. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Clark, 478 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(“[The state rule] is a procedural precedent which must be fulfilled before filing suit in a state
court. Because it is a procedural precondition to sue, it overrides the procedural framework
of § 1983 when the litigant chooses a state court forum.” (citation omitted)), overruled by Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). The Clark court cited an Indiana Supreme Court case, Thompson v. City
of Aurora, 325 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. 1975), for the proposition that the state rule was “procedural.” Id.
Thompson was a case that deemed the state rule procedural as a matter of state law. 325 N.E.2d at
842. The characterization of the state rule as procedural for state law purposes obviously has no
application to whether the state rule is procedural when it comes to its clash with a federal law.
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Some state courts twist this analysis in a way that leads to the use of a
state rule. Most commonly, the state court will misinterpret the Supreme
Court’s general–specific state rule distinction. Instead of asking whether the
state rule is substance-specific or transsubstantive, the state court asks
whether a substance-specific state rule discriminates against the federal
right.255 Again, state courts can find authority in Supreme Court decisions
when engaging in this discrimination inquiry.256
However, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court should give weight only
to transsubstantive state rules “regarding the administration of the state
courts.”257 A federal statute is less likely to require a uniform judge-made
rule where a transsubstantive state rule is being used because an underlying
part of the state judicial system is being displaced.258 Simply because a
substance-specific state rule does not discriminate against a federal right
does not mean that a federal statute is more or less likely to require a
uniform judge-made rule.
Other state courts distinguish the facts of the case they are considering
from the Supreme Court’s reverse-Erie cases and, having done so, find that
there is nothing barring the court from using state law.259 These courts are
ostensibly looking for a Supreme Court case that deals precisely with the
facts presented to them before they will disregard the state rule. This
approach abdicates the state courts’ obligation to determine whether the
Supreme Court would find that a federal statute requires a uniform judgemade rule. Simply because such a federal common law rule does not yet
exist, does not mean the Supreme Court, if presented with the case, would
not find that a federal statute requires one.
Some state courts adopt the position that they will always defer to whatever federal policy comes into conflict with the state rule under the principle

255 See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 281 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. App. 2009) (citing
Johnson as a basis for using a state notice-of-claim statute because the state statute “uniformly
applies to all plaintiffs in suits against a county and its officials”), rev’d on other grounds, 341 S.W.3d
919 (Tex. 2011). A state notice-of-claim statute that applies only in suits against a county and its
officials is a substance-specific state rule, not a transsubstantive rule.
256 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
257 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997).
258 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text; cf. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918 (“[O]ur normal
presumption against pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court’s
dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state Rule regarding the administration of the state
courts.” (emphasis added)).
259 See, e.g., Bean v. S.C. Cent. R.R. Co., 709 S.E.2d 99, 107-09 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (distinguishing Dice and holding, without further reverse-Erie analysis, that a challenge to a FELA
release does not preclude summary judgment).
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of comity.260 Because these state courts do so as a matter of state common
law, their practice is not incorrect. However, this Comment lays out a
framework for state court judges that clarifies the analysis and should make
it unnecessary to always defer to federal law.
While comity plays a role in the weight a state court should give to decisions of lower federal courts,261 it does not protect states’ rights as well as a
true federal common law creation analysis does. The better analysis is to
undertake a searching inquiry as to whether the federal statute “requires”
that something other than state law apply, rather than assume that a federal
statute requires a uniform judge-made rule whenever it conflicts in a minor
way with a state rule.
Finally, some state courts utilize an outcome-determination test that
asks whether following the state rule would lead to a different outcome than
if the case in question was filed in federal court.262 Again, in basing reverseErie decisions on this outcome-determination principle, the state courts can
find authority in decisions of the Supreme Court.263 As explained earlier in
this Comment, whether a state rule is outcome-determinative sheds little
light on whether the federal statute requires that something other than state
law apply.
However, despite many misguided approaches to reverse-Erie problems,
some state courts do engage in some parts of the proposed analytical
framework laid out in this Comment. Some courts try to determine the
general intent of Congress to ascertain the clarity and substantiality of the
260 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Price, 539 So. 2d 202, 205-06 (Ala. 1988) (“Judicial
comity causes us, as a state court, to defer to federal law . . . .”). In Price, the plaintiff brought a
FELA action, and a state rule provided a mechanism for state court defendants to move to dismiss
an action upon the death of the plaintiff if a motion for substitution was not made within six
months of the death. Id. at 203. The defendant moved to dismiss on that basis, and the plaintiff
objected, citing FELA’s provision that “[a]ny right of action given by this chapter to a person
suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative.” Id. at 205. On its face, the
FELA death provision did not foreclose a state from imposing limiting rules related to substitution. However, rather than engaging in any analysis regarding a potential conflict between the
federal policy behind the FELA death provision and the state rule, the state court declined to
follow the state rule. In doing so, the state court noted that “[u]nder the concepts of civility and
courtesy (which we reach before we reach the concept that an Alabama law that interferes with a
federal law must yield), we defer to federal law, whether it be substantive or procedural, in
enforcing a federal cause of action . . . .” Id. at 206.
261 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
262 See New Dimensions, Inc. v. Tarquini, 743 S.E.2d 267, 271 (Va. 2013) (“[W]e hold that
application of Virginia pleading standards to the EPA affirmative defenses would not lead to a
substantial difference in outcomes of state and federal EPA actions. Therefore, we will apply
Virginia procedural law concerning the pleading of affirmative defenses in EPA actions brought in
Virginia courts.”).
263 See supra notes 190-91.
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federal policy that is in conflict with a state rule.264 Additionally, other
courts correctly follow Supreme Court precedent, giving more weight in the
federal common law creation analysis to transsubstantive state rules.265
CONCLUSION
The most critical departure this Comment has made from reverse-Erie
scholarship is to proceed on the basis that reverse-Erie is just a decision
about whether to create federal common law. Most of the analytical confusion about reverse-Erie—namely, that reverse-Erie cases can be analyzed
using Erie doctrines like outcome-determination and the procedure–
substance dichotomy—is a product of failing to understand that concept. In
addition, this Comment regards the Rules of Decision Act as controlling the
creation of federal common law and doing so in both federal and state court.
Based on these concepts, this Comment has presented one possible approach to treating reverse-Erie problems—a Rules of Decision Act approach. Such an approach would facilitate a uniform theory of reverse-Erie
that would clear up the current confusion in the doctrine at the Supreme
Court level (and, thus, also at the state court level).
However, because there are other theories of federal common law making than those that flow from a Rules of Decision Act approach, there are
alternate theories of reverse-Erie. The next step is for scholars that subscribe to other theories of federal common law making to evaluate reverseErie under those theories as this Comment has done with the Rules of
Decision Act.

264 See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 548 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Cal. 1976) (identifying the strong
remedial policy of Congress behind § 1983 and declining to apply a state notice-of-claim statute
that conflicted with this policy); Axess Int’l, Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co, 30 P.3d 1, 8 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001) (following a state rule about reimbursement of attorney’s fees in insurance litigation
where the court found that the federal policy behind a uniform rule was not clear).
265 See, e.g., Roberts v. CSX Transp., Inc., 688 S.E.2d 178, 184 (Va. 2010) (applying a state
rule mandating that certain jurors be excused for cause by the court rather than through a
peremptory strike because the rule applied to all jury trials in any action in the state courts).

